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Fall 2006, Volume 2

This article discusses the Zimbabwean land crisis from a rights perspective. After reviewing colonial and postcolonial history, the article looks at the rights dilemmas generated by the land crisis. It concludes by suggesting policies that attempt to constructively engage all parties concerned.

 

Introduction

“If yesterday I fought you [the whites] as an enemy, today you have become a friend with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself.”

—    Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, April 1980 (International Crisis Group 2004, 31)

“We must deliver the land unencumbered by impediments to its rightful owners.  It is theirs by birth; it is theirs by natural and legal right.  It is theirs by struggle.  Indeed their(s) by legacy.”

— Robert Mugabe, March 2001 (Vaknin 2002)

 

The land issue in Zimbabwe has been fraught with emotions: for many Africans, it is about restitution; for many whites, it is about retribution.  However, the events in Zimbabwe go beyond the mere issue of land.  This article seeks to highlight the fundamental human rights issues raised by the actions of President Mugabe’s government.  A better understanding of these issues would allow a meaningful debate about land, rights, and the meaning of citizenship, not only in Zimbabwe, but also in the rest of Southern Africa, a region that remains beset with inequalities inherited from white minority rule. 

Whose Land Is It Anyway?

Land ownership has been a central issue in what is now Zimbabwe since the end of the nineteenth century, which saw the arrival of white settlers as part of a British vision to extend the empire from the “Cape to Cairo” (Ranger 2004).  The settlers established themselves in a territory that was inhabited by mainly two peoples, the Shona and the Ndebele.  The increased appropriation of land by the settlers, and the imposition of a hut tax, resulted in an uprising in 1896-1897 by both groups, which was violently suppressed.  This early resistance movement came to be known as the First Chimurenga.[1]  White settlement subsequently increased, and by 1914, Africans had been “harshly restricted to a mere 23% of the worst land in designated reserves” (Lawton 2002); by 1919, “a system of dual land tenure [had been enshrined], where whites enjoyed private titles and access to land, and blacks continued to be governed by customary law” (International Crisis Group 2004), a system that, in practicality, remained in place until 2000.

In 1922, a referendum was held among white settlers, and Southern Rhodesia, as the territory had been named, became a self-governing colony that could decide on its own policies, especially with regard to land.  In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act was adopted by the local settler legislature, under which 51 percent of the land was allocated to about 3,000 white farmers (International Crisis Group 2004, 23), at a time when the African population had reached 1.2 million.  After the second world war, the British government encouraged further white settlement in the colony, which resulted in the eviction of about 300,000 Africans (out of a population of 2.8 million in 1951) from land reserved for white farmers, who had by 1955 settled on about 6,000 large-scale commercial farms, a number that remained relatively steady until the late 1970s (International Crisis Group 2004, 24).

Faced with increased pressure from the British government to grant full political rights to the African majority in the colony (at a time when other British colonies in Africa were becoming independent), the settler government declared unilateral independence in 1965 and reaffirmed the dual division of the land with the Land Tenure Act in 1969, which allocated 50 percent of the country to commercial farmers, who were overwhelmingly white.  However, the government was soon faced with the emergence of Shona and Ndebele armed resistance movements, which increased in strength throughout the 1970s.  One of their central objectives was to restore the land to the African majority, and they referred to their campaign as the Second Chimurenga, in an explicit analogy with the 1896-1897 uprising.  In 1978, the Land Tenure Act was abolished, and in 1979, a peace accord (the Lancaster House Agreement) was finally brokered by the British government (which regained nominal control over the colony), that resulted in the country’s independence as Zimbabwe in 1980.   

At independence, the 4,500 large-scale commercial farms that emerged unscathed from the war occupied about 40 percent of the land (International Crisis Group 2004, 25), or about 15.5 million hectares.  The constitution agreed at Lancaster House guaranteed both property and citizenship rights of commercial farmers, who could only be expropriated on a “willing seller, willing buyer” basis, a principle that formed the basis of the Land Acquisition Act of 1985.  In 1982, the Zimbabwean government embarked on an ambitious program that would resettle 165,000 black Zimbabwean households (about one million people) on about nine million hectares (Chironga n.d., 6).  The British government provided about £44 million in financial support during the 1980s, but the program eventually petered out, among allegations of mismanagement (Chironga n.d.).  By 1989, about 52,000 families had been resettled on about 2.7 million hectares (Chironga n.d.).  More importantly, white commercial agriculture regained much strength after 1980 and appeared to be tacitly supported by the Zimbabwean government.  For example, the government did make little use of commercial farmland that had become available,[2] did not purchase farms that were put up for sale at the end of the war by older commercial farmers, and did not repeal colonial laws that discriminated against small-scale black farmers (International Crisis Group 2004, 32) and restricted the subdivision of large-scale commercial farms (see Table 1) (International Crisis Group 2004, 25).  In isolated cases, the government also removed squatters from commercial farms.

Table 1: Structure of Land Ownership, 1995

	No.a	Average size (ha)b	% of output
Commercial farms (mainly white-owned)	4,700	3,000	80
Communal farms	800,000	20	18c
Resettlement areas	62,000	50	2
a Estimates.  b Although average sizes vary widely, 10 ha constitutes a viable holding in arable areas; 100 ha is adequate in drier regions.  c The communal share tends to fall sharply in drought years.
Sources: Commercial Farmers’ Union; Financial Gazette.  In Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004-2005.

 

As a result, the land remained mostly in the hands of white farmers when the Lancaster House Agreement expired in 1990.  The pace of resettlement remained slow until a new Land Acquisition Act was adopted in 1997, allowing the Zimbabwean government to expropriate commercial farmers in return for fair compensation (Chironga n.d., 7).  Anxious to prevent a disorderly resettlement program, foreign donors agreed to support the government, and an international conference in 1998 endorsed the government’s Land Reform and Resettlement Program, which envisaged the compulsory acquisition, but with fair compensation, of about 40 percent of commercial farmland.  The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), which represented the interests of white farmers, also launched a proposal, Team Zimbabwe, under which each commercial farmer would give a portion of his lands for resettlement, while retaining a core holding.[3]

At the same time, however, President Mugabe’s government, in power since 1980, was facing mounting domestic opposition, on the one hand from a group purporting to be veterans from the liberation war, and on the other from the labor movement, which received some financing from white farmers.  While the “war veterans” sought financial compensation from the government for their involvement in the liberation war (which they obtained), the labor movement turned itself into a political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which in February 2000 successfully defeated a referendum on a new constitution sponsored by the government.  Shortly thereafter, in April 2000, the ruling party only narrowly won the parliamentarian elections against the MDC. 

By 2000, a total of only 70,000 black families had been resettled on about 3.5 million hectares of land, while about 11.2 million hectares, or about 30 percent of the total land, were still held by 4,400 (mainly white) large-scale commercial farmers (Chironga n.d., 6).  With its hold on power in doubt, President Mugabe’s government decided to use the purported war veterans to evict white farmers.  His “Fast-Track” Land Resettlement Program saw the forcible eviction of white farmers and their workers in a campaign that lasted from 2001 to 2003.  By 2005, fewer than 500 white farmers had retained their lands, and some evictions are still ongoing.[4]  About 2,000 farmers moved to the cities, waiting for changes in circumstances, while the remainder emigrated, some to neighboring countries.  The government has claimed that about 300,000 black families (or the equivalent of 1.8 million people) have been resettled, but a report by the Land Review Commission concluded that, between 2001 and mid-2003, only about 127,000 small-scale farmers had been resettled and 1,700 new black commercial farms had been set up.[5]  These numbers have to be viewed against the concomitant eviction of up to 250,000 farm workers and their families (or the equivalent of 1.5 million people) by October 2002 (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 2003, 30).  Furthermore, the government has not allocated title deeds to the new farmers and has allocated many farms to people with close connections to the ruling party (Economic Intelligence Unit n.d., Country Profile).

It is clear that the land resettlement program has been an economic disaster, with dramatic drops in agricultural productivity and economic growth (see Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Real GDP Growth and Agricultural Growth

The main crops (such as maize and wheat) have all experienced contraction of up to 90 percent from 2000-2003 (Richardson 2005).  Zimbabwe, once a net exporter of food, has been unable to feed its population since 2002.  In March 2004, an estimated 7.5 million people (or about 60 percent of the population) were dependent on food aid provided by the international community (Economic Intelligence Unit n.d., Country Profile).  The Economist Intelligence Unit wrote:

The land reform programme can only be judged as a failure.  Agricultural production has collapsed, and where land has been allocated to peasants the government has failed to provide inputs to allow them to sustain production on their new plots.  Owing to poor rains, many have since abandoned their plots, and commercial farmers have not returned, fearing intimidation and violence. (Economic  Intelligence Unit n.d., Country Profile)

            The program has significantly contributed to the demise of the Zimbabwean economy, which has shrunk by a third since 2000 (Economic  Intelligence Unit n.d., Country Data).  Furthermore, “the damage to property rights [has] destroyed three key [...] components of the marketplace: investor trust, land equity, and entrepreneurial knowledge and incentives” (Richardson 2005).  As a result, it is estimated that the value of commercial farmland fell by as much as US $5.3 billion (Richardson 2005), roughly equivalent to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000, and can now be considered as “dead capital.”  Zimbabwe has now returned, according to some estimates, to the income level of 1953 (Clemens and Moss 2005).  According to the Center for Global Development:

Zimbabwe’s recent economic crisis is so deep that it has set the country back more than half a century.  The scale and speed of this income decline is unusual outside of a war situation.  In fact, the income losses in Zimbabwe have been greater than those experienced during recent conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. (Clemens and Moss 2005)

Rights?  What Rights?

While the eviction of white commercial farmers was surely not more terrible than that endured by indigenous blacks over the last 100 years, neither wrong can be condoned. (International Crisis Group 2004, 119)

President Mugabe has garnered considerable support in Africa for the eviction of white farmers from Zimbabwe’s lands.  After all, the land was often forcibly appropriated by white settlers from the indigenous African people of the country, the struggle for independence was fought over the land, and it seemed highly unfair, if not discriminatory, for such a small number of white farmers to hold sway over such large tracts of land in Zimbabwe.  Moreover, many white farmers had shown little willingness to share their lands after independence, had actually often opposed the government’s land reform program, and some, if not most, had retained very unreformed views about the African majority.  From this viewpoint, one could argue that the farmers had finally received their comeuppance for their century-long domination, characterized by oppression and discrimination.  At long last, the indigenous African people of Zimbabwe would now occupy the land that should be rightfully theirs.  From the government’s perspective, the program has empowered the poor and helped secure both political stability and economic growth, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

More importantly, President Mugabe has explicitly made the argument that he does not recognize Western rights anymore and that he is leading the African resistance to a neocolonial order, as highlighted by the slogan “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” (Ranger 2004), used by the ruling party.  Under his vision, white farmers were just pawns used to perpetuate that colonial order.  He has been referring to an entirely different set of values, which relies on the notion of a patriotic history that “proclaim(s) the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition” and the rejection of “Western ‘bogus universalism’ which it depicts as a denial of the concrete history of global oppression” (Ranger 2004).  This vision was spelled out in the state-owned Herald in 2003[6]:

Mugabe is now every African who is opposed to the British and North American plunder and exploitation…. The Zimbabwe opposition and their British, European and North American sponsors have exposed themselves as forces opposed to Mugabe as Pan-African memory, Mugabe as the reclaimer of African space, Mugabe as the African power of remembering the African legacy and African heritage which slavery, apartheid and imperialism thought they had dismembered for good. (Ranger 2004)

Robert Mugabe therefore places himself within an entirely different set of values.  Against the alleged illegitimacy of colonial rule, and rights derived from that time, he proposes “African” rights, which would be more authentic and, more importantly, could be legitimately used to undo past injustices.  This, of course, raises several fundamental human rights issues: Can “African” rights take precedence over “Western” rights?  Can indigenous rights take precedence over citizenship rights?  Can group rights take precedence over individual rights?

Can “African” Rights Take Precedence over “Western” Rights?

The African people of Zimbabwe rose early against the settlers; they have not ceased to resist the confiscation of their lands since 1895; and the struggle for independence drew heavily on Shona and Ndebele spiritual traditions (Ranger 2004).  Reclaiming the land is therefore about reestablishing the natural connection between the African people and their land.  However, the liberation movement that came to power at independence did not draw on these rights once in power.  On the contrary, it accepted a constitution that was drawn along Western lines, especially with regard to rights of property, and has since maintained a legalistic, British-inspired, tradition.[7]  President Mugabe scrupulously respected the framework set out in the Lancaster House Agreement until 1990, has retained the constitution drawn in 1980 (although it has been amended several times since), and has even used emergency laws drafted during colonial times to suppress domestic opposition.[8] 

While there can be a legitimate debate about whether black Zimbabweans, who had suffered from decades of institutional — and cultural — racism, would have been able to develop an indigenous legal framework so soon after independence, it would seem that the central aim of the liberation struggle was not to revert to some form of precolonial state, but to enable the African majority to take over the society that had been shaped by the arrival of white settlers in the nineteenth century.  It is on this basis that Zimbabwe was established in 1980, as a modern state, fully sovereign, a member of the international community, bound by laws and treaties.  “Western” rights can therefore be considered as rights that are entirely legitimate in Zimbabwe and that seem to be accepted by the vast majority of Zimbabweans.  Indeed, the popular opposition has consistently called for the rightful use of these rights by the government. 

Can Indigenous Rights Take Precedence over Citizenship Rights?

A second question raised by the land issue is whether the indigenous African people in Zimbabwe should have a primordial right to the land, and whether their rights should take precedence over other rights.  Supporters of this line of thinking tend to argue that the territory that is now Zimbabwe already “possesse(d) an unusual degree of geographical and historical coherence” (Ranger 2003) before the arrival of the settlers in the nineteenth century and that the African people of Zimbabwe therefore have an inherent right to the land.  However, demographic trends were often in flux.  For example, one African people, the Ndebele, settled in the territory only a few decades before whites arrived.[9]  Furthermore, Southern Rhodesia at the turn of the century was sparsely settled, with only about 700,000 inhabitants (Chitiyo 2000).  Of course, the absence of a large population cannot be used as an excuse for white encroachment, but at least some land could not have possibly been forcefully taken from the African majority.  Displacement only occurred on a large-scale basis after World War II, when African peasants were massively evicted from land reserved for white settlers (particularly veterans). 

However, even under these circumstances, can indigenous rights trump citizenship rights?  While some countries have different concepts of citizenship rights (Germany, for example, has long used the right of blood as a basis for citizenship), Zimbabwe explicitly embraced the right of soil at independence.  The 1980 constitution gives a specific right to citizenship to all people who lived in the country at the time.[10]  Many white farmers were born in the country, often in families that had resided there for several generations, and a large majority of them were Zimbabwean citizens.  Moreover, most had acquired the land after independence (with title deeds delivered by the same government that later disowned them), in transactions where the government, under the 1985 Land Acquisition Act, had the first right to purchase their land for redistribution (a right that was rarely exercised).  In addition, the white farmers often obtained court orders that invalidated the eviction orders (Chitiyo 2000), only to have these ignored by the government.  There can be no doubt therefore that the white farmers also have legitimate rights to their lands.

Can Group Rights Take Precedence over Individual Rights?

Finally, the last question may be the more fundamental one: can there be any group rights in a modern society, if Zimbabwe defines itself as such?  It would be difficult to categorize any group in terms that would give any superior claim to another.  Under the Zimbabwean constitution of 1980, all individuals in the country are treated as equals.[11]  While most commercial land had at some point been forcefully obtained by white farmers at the expense of African peasants, the white farmers in 2000 were not the ones who evicted African peasants in 1895 or in 1945.  Some may have indeed inherited their lands, but many farmers were individuals who had secured their land after independence, by legal means and with the approval of the state.  While white farmers were certainly economically and institutionally advantaged, and probably were therefore more able to exercise their rights, they did not apply as a group to purchase the farms. 

There cannot be inter-temporal groups that have wronged or been wronged; there are only individuals in a specific context, time, and space.  By giving group attributes to the white farmers, the Zimbabwean government practices a form of discrimination, by assigning them a collective set of characteristics instead of considering them as individuals.  It would seem that the basis of a modern democracy can only be individuals, not groups.  Indeed, the liberation movements in Zimbabwe all fought against the white minority regime for the fundamental principle of “one man, one vote”.  White farmers, as individuals, as citizens, therefore deserve the same rights (and duties) as other citizens in the country. 

What Next?

The story of land in Zimbabwe is a tale of lost opportunity and all too frequent tragedy. (International Crisis Group 2004, 131)

With the current government ensconced in power, some closure on the land issue is only likely to be achieved by a post-Mugabe opposition government.  Land will no doubt be one of the more pressing issues for such a government.  Many of the white farmers are still in the country, in possession of their title deeds, which have been mostly upheld by Zimbabwean courts.  Furthermore, as pointed out before, the white farmers are mostly citizens.[12]  On the other hand, black commercial and peasant farmers are established on former white farms, although much of that land lies fallow.[13]  Furthermore, very few have access to title deeds.  There are therefore a number of imperatives in terms of policy recommendations: (a) implementing a fair redistribution of the land that takes into account the rights of white and black farmers and (b) creating a Citizen Compact that will lay the foundation for rights in a new Zimbabwe.

Should Land Be Returned to White Farmers?

The first question that a new opposition government will have to address will be whether to restitute the land to evicted white farmers.  While a case can certainly be made in favor of such a measure, in light of the issues raised in this article, and in light of the legal framework in Zimbabwe, pursuing such an endeavor is both impossible and undesirable.  Many white farmers have left the country,[14] a substantial number of people have been resettled on their lands, and no new Zimbabwean government can afford, either financially or politically, to reverse the land resettlement program.  What are required instead are ways to ensure a fair redistribution of the land, taking into account the following imperatives: promoting legitimate distribution of land (for both black and white farmers) and restoring food production (with support to new black farmers).

A Legitimate Land Dispensation Is Required

The first task would be to establish a National Land Commission that will investigate the land eviction process conducted since 2000.  The commission would need to be of reasonable size and composed of a representative array of Zimbabwean agricultural stakeholders, which would include white commercial farmers, black commercial farmers, farm workers, and communal peasants, whose numbers will be balanced by technical experts and representatives from neighboring countries and the international community.  Including the latter two should make a new land dispensation internationally binding and legitimate.  The commission should, however, be led by Zimbabweans, and its recommendations should be subject to a binding national referendum. 

The commission’s remit needs to be ambitious, wide-ranging, and set the framework for a new land dispensation in Zimbabwe, which balances the legitimate rights of all parties to the land issue, while at the same time being practical.  While it would be impossible to evict the resettled farmers and difficult for the Zimbabwean government to provide compensation to the original owners, given its likely lack of resources, in a modern, democratic state, both black and white Zimbabweans have a right to land.  The commission will need to review both commercial land and communal land, with the overarching objective to establish a set of property rights in Zimbabwe.  As Hernando de Soto points out: “a property system creates a network through which people can rearrange their assets into more valuable combinations” (Richardson 2005) and is therefore a key cornerstone for economic development.

Except for farms handed out to cronies of the government as a form of patronage, where the expropriation should be declared null and void, all resettled farmers should remain on their lands.  However, the existing commercial farms, which tend to be very large, should be subdivided in a way that there would be space on these farms for the resettled farmers, the original farmers, and the displaced farm workers.  When this is not feasible, either the resettled farmers or the original owners (depending on the circumstances) should be provided with alternative land, of which much remains available.  Title deeds should be provided to all.  It is important not to destroy the remaining infrastructure of commercial farms, which are close to markets and have traditionally provided the bedrock of the Zimbabwean economy.

However, the commission will also need to address the issue of communal lands, where title deeds should be established at long last.  This is likely to result in some resistance from traditional leaders, but these areas have suffered from decades of deprivation, and a well-informed program should win over rural dwellers.  Each family in communal areas should be allocated with ownership rights to a plot of land, instead of the present usufruct rights.  The size of the plots should be determined on an equal basis nationally, taking into account a number of factors, including soil fertility.  A general land registry with title deeds should be established in communal areas.  In addition, land rights in communal areas should be protected against speculative purchases, which would tend to benefit commercial farmers.

A Citizen Compact Is Required As Well

In addition to the land commission, Zimbabwe needs to restore a Citizen Compact between the state and society, where rights, in particular property rights, and duties of each are enshrined.  This compact, which can take the form of a constitution (and which would include the recommendations of the land commission), needs to be drafted by all stakeholders of Zimbabwean society, possibly in the form of a National Constitutional Convention, and should be adopted by referendum to confer the necessary legitimacy.  This is akin to what happened in South Africa during the constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s, when a bill of rights was enshrined in the new constitution.  This has also, incidentally, been a demand of the popular opposition since the late 1990s.

Conclusion

The land issue in Zimbabwe raises some fundamental human rights questions.  One should in particular consider the pernicious effects of the Zimbabwean government’s rhetoric.  By placing “African” rights above rights that are legitimate in Zimbabwe, it has denied basic human rights to some of its citizens.  Such rights are precisely what the liberation movements fought for, not only in Zimbabwe, but also in the rest of southern Africa.  The actions of the Zimbabwean government cannot therefore be condoned.

Indeed, supporting the land policy of President Mugabe’s government would mean supporting the selective application of human rights.  This question is of great import in all southern Africa, which has experienced white minority rule and the resulting inequities in terms of land allocation, wealth distribution, and access to opportunities.  As these countries, and particularly South Africa, strive to overcome their colonial legacies, build democratic societies, and accommodate the rights of indigenous people and the large number of people (10 million) who are not (or exclusively) of African origin, it is important that rights be defined in a manner that is inclusive, legitimate, and sustainable.

The proposed Citizen Compact in Zimbabwe could set an example in starting to overcome the deep inequities inherited from colonial rule and create a new dispensation accepted by all.  One can only hope that the land crisis in Zimbabwe will bring about the leadership that can help secure the peaceful future of Southern Africa.

References

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions. 2003. Global survey 9, forced evictions, violations of human rights, May.

Chironga, Mutsa. N.d. Which laws or procedures should be used to determine land ownership when a new government comes to power in Zimbabwe? Unpublished paper, John F.  Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Chitiyo, Tapera. 2000. Reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s land and war veterans’ debate in land violence and compensation. Track Two 9(1), May. Available online at http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html (accessed on 1 December 2005).

Clemens, Michael and Todd Moss. 2005. Costs and causes of Zimbabwe’s crisis.  Center for Global Development, 20 July.  Available online at www.cgdev.org/files/2918_file_Zimbabwe_Crisis.pdf.

Economist Intelligence Unit. N.d. Country data.

Economist Intelligence Unit. N.d. Country profile 2004-2005. 

International Crisis Group. 2004. Blood and soil: Land, politics and conflict prevention in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Africa Report, No. 85, 17 September. 

Lawton, Steve. 2002. British colonialism, Zimbabwe’s land reform and settler resistance. Portland Independent Media Center, 26 November. Available online at http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2002/11/35733.shtml (accessed on 1 December 2005).

Ranger, Terence. 2003. Encyclopedia of religion and war: Zimbabwe. Routledge. Available online at www.routledge-ny.com/religionandsociety/war/zimbabwe.html (accessed on 1 December 2005).

Ranger, Terence. 2004. Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies 30(2), June. Available online at www.britain-zimbabwe.org.uk/ZimbHistoriogrqphy.htm (accessed on 1 December 2005).

Richardson, Craig J. 2005. The loss of property rights and the collapse of Zimbabwe. Cato Journal 25(3), Fall. Available online at www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj25n3/cj25n3-12.pdf.

Vaknin, Sam. 2002. White farms, black farmers. Available online at samvak.tripod.com/landreform.html accessed on (1 December 2005). 

 

Appendix I: The Zimbabwean Constitution of 1980

The information presented in this appendix is directly excerpted from the constitution.

Annex C: Summary of the Independence Constitution

B.  Citizenship

1. Every person who was a citizen of Rhodesia immediately before Independence will automatically become a citizen of Zimbabwe on Independence (by birth, descent or registration, as the case may be, according to his former status).  Every person who, immediately before Independence, possessed such qualifications that the relevant authority would, upon application duly made, have registered him as a citizen of Rhodesia, will be entitled to make application in the prescribed manner at any time during the first five years after Independence and it will be incumbent upon the competent authority to grant that application and cause him to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe. 

C.  Declaration of Rights

V.  Freedom from Deprivation of Property

1. Every person will be protected from having his property compulsorily acquired except when the acquisition is in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the development or utilisation of that or other property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit or, in the case of under-utilised land, settlement of land for agricultural purposes.  When property is wanted for one of these purposes, its acquisition will be lawful only on condition that the law provides for the prompt payment of adequate compensation and, where the acquisition is contested, that a court order is obtained.  A person whose property is so acquired will be guaranteed the right of access to the High Court to determine the amount of compensation. 

2. Exception will be made for the taking of possession of property during a period of public emergency. 

3. Compensation paid in respect of loss of land to anyone who is a citizen of or ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe (or to a company the majority of whose shareholders are such persons) will, within a reasonable time, be remittable to any country outside Zimbabwe, free from any deduction, tax or charge in respect of its remission, but subject always to:

a.  its attachment, by order of a court, in connection with civil proceedings; and

b.  reasonable restrictions as to the manner in which the payment is to be remitted. 

4. The Constitution will, on the same basis as in other Declarations of Rights, make clear that a number of transactions which might be considered to involve an element of compulsory acquisition will not be so regarded for the purposes of the Declaration of Rights. 

5. It will be made clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that the property covered by this constitutional guarantee includes rights, whether vested or contingent, of individuals to receive benefits under a law, contract or scheme relating to the payment of pension benefits. 

Appendix II: Land Distribution in Zimbabwe, 2000

In this map, the commercial farmlands are in grey and the communal (and depleted) lands in white.  Source: Satellite evidence of the land crisis in Zimbabwe (wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/map.nsf/wPreview/B2729E71E8E6C30085256A33005411EF?Opendocument).

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© 2006 President and Fellows of Harvard University