Fall 2006, Volume 2
In the 1960s and 1970s, China had a visible presence on the African continent, with its own distinctive ideological branding in a three-way competition with the United States and the USSR. As part of its marketing strategy, it dotted the continent with equally distinctive and quaint aid projects: modest cigarette and match factories and massive peoples’ sports stadiums. Its signature project was the famous — and famously expensive — Tanzam Railway, designed to free states in Southern Africa from dependence on South African ports.
By the time the Cold War ended, China’s profile in Africa had diminished considerably, its Africa policy yet another casualty of the Cultural Revolution. Two decades later, China has returned to Africa with brio — or, some might say, with a vengeance. The China-Africa summit that took place in Beijing in November 2006, which attracted some forty African heads of state, was not so much an announcement of China’s return as a confirmation, coming as it did in the wake of no fewer than three visits to the continent by senior Chinese political leaders in the last three years.
No less lavish than the accommodations in Beijing were China’s promises of greatly expanded economic assistance, coupled with pledges to purchase $1.9 billion in African exports. For a continent in desperate need of both, the Beijing “deliverables” should have been welcome, indeed. Why, then, were there so many echoes of unease, not only in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic but in some African circles as well?
For those who have traced the steps of China’s return to the continent, the reasons are fairly obvious. On the one hand, the motivation for China’s renewed interest could not be clearer. Not only does it urgently require new sources of energy and raw materials to feed the industrial beast it has succeeded in creating, it also desperately needs new markets for its burgeoning industrial output. On the other, in its pursuit of these, it has been quite prepared to truck with even the most odious of the continent’s authoritarian and kleptocratic regimes, most notably Sudan, where President Omar Bashir has skillfully used China’s influence in the United Nations (UN) Security Council to shield his government from UN intervention in Darfur, and Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe continues to defy international criticism of his increasingly despotic rule.
China explains its approach as one based on a respect for sovereignty and a principled disinclination to meddle in the affairs of others — principles it would also insist upon for itself when others might be tempted to take exception to the flaws in China’s own interpretations of democracy, human rights, and the rule of/by law. Critics are much more inclined to see in China’s hot pursuit of oil and minerals reflections of the mercantilism that drove Europe’s “scramble for Africa” in the 19th century. And in China’s undue deference to African sovereignty some see a convenient excuse for not allowing moral considerations to get in the way of its unfettered pursuit of economic interests. As for its seemingly generous offers of aid and trade, many argue that China could do much more to help the continent by making a serious effort to help resolve the impasse in the Doha Round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization. For starters, it could commit to doing something about its currency, the undervaluation of which has contributed not only to unsustainable trade imbalances with the United States, but also to destruction of nascent African industries that simply can’t compete with the massive influx of underpriced Chinese goods.
The real danger in China’s new strategy for African engagement, however, is that it threatens to undo the genuine progress made during the past two decades toward more representative and responsible government. At risk, as well, are the tenuous foundations of the newly established African Union (AU), together with the AU’s signature program, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Both are premised on the conviction that Africa’s future growth and development — not to mention its peace and stability — require a sustained commitment to good governance, respect for human rights, and a climate conducive to investment and trade.
In its report of January 2006, a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations warned that China’s Africa strategy represented a double-edged threat, one requiring of the United States and others a two-pronged response. The first prong consists of providing more encouragement and support — and resources — to those African governments earnestly seeking to improve their governance and economic performance. The second is greater diplomatic engagement with China, at the highest levels, on those practices that conflict with U.S. interests — and presumably with long-term interests of both Africa and China as well. The Bush administration will have a perfect opportunity to put the second part of that strategy to work in December 2006, when U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson is scheduled to lead a high-level mission to China, with participation by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman. I can think of no more effective messenger for hammering home the widely shared concern regarding China’s current approach to Africa and the long-term damage it could cause.
* George Moose is a former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He has also served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Benin and to the Republic of Senegal. He is currently an Adjunct Professor and Professorial Lecturer in International Practice at George Washington University and a Fellow at the Institute of Politics at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.