In April 1984 I was assigned as Turkey’s Ambassador to Athens. My tenure there lasted for five years. The Athens posting is bound to be challenging for any Turkish diplomat. In my case, in addition to the usual challenges I witnessed first-hand how Greece and Turkey came to and then pulled back from the brink of war in 1987, and subsequently launched a diplomatic initiative at Davos to settle their differences. In this presentation, I would like to describe my dealings with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou particularly in 1987: how we tackled crisis-management in the Aegean that year, and the diplomatic opening that subsequently brought together Prime Ministers Ozal and Papandreou, and the talks that followed as part of the Davos process.

 My posting to Athens was at a time when Greek-Turkish relations were at low ebb. The Pasok government pursued what we viewed as a determined anti-Turkish policy. Before I left for Athens, Prime Minister Ozal instructed me that I should be keen in giving to the incumbents as well as the people of Greece the true impression that Turkey coveted no ill aspirations on Greek soil and wanted to become friends and co-operate for mutual interests as well as for the security of the region. Ozal also said: “ I am also going to give you a farewell present which you will find on your desk in Athens…”. This was the unilateral lifting of the visa obligation for Greeks who wished to visit Turkey. 

After I presented my credentials to President Karamanlis, I asked for an appointment from Prime Minister Papandreou. I then started my rounds with the Ministers of the Cabinet. During my first visit to Foreign Minister Papoulias, I underlined that I was instructed to make an official proposal and emphasized that Greece and Turkey might have disagreements in certain areas but they generally shared common interests, which shaped their policies. It was desirable, therefore, that they both exerted all possible efforts with a view to eliminating the difficulties in their relations. I proposed that high-level officials of our two countries should meet at an early date and initiate work on a ‘Political Document’ and also on another paper concerning ‘Means Designed to Prevent Unwarranted Strains’. In fact, I left copies of drafts of these documents that listed our proposals. Foreign Minister Papoulias listened and in gist said: “Thank you Mr. Ambassador, I wish you luck!” I never heard about our official proposals in my subsequent dealings with Greek officials … the other Greek Ministers that I called on were courteous and respectful but distant. When our generally short conversations came to the point where I ventured to suggest that we should find ways to ameliorate our relations I got the same simple answer from them: “Turkey must withdraw its forces from Cyprus first and then we will see….” I did not fail to reply that we had intervened in Cyprus as a guarantor power on the basis of international agreements also signed by Greece and the Greek Cypriots and in order to forestall the annexation of the island by the military junta in Greece. But I felt that my justification of our Cyprus intervention fell on deaf ears. 

 I had a cordial first meeting with Mr. Papandreou after three months of waiting. He asked me what I intended to do in Athens. I explained to him that my mission was to create mutual understanding between our two countries. We had problems between our two countries but also common stakes in the region and therefore we should start a dialogue and join our hands as it was done many years ago between our two great masters. I told him about the unilateral lifting of the Turkish visa and suggested a follow-up on the part of the Greek side. I underlined that Mr. Ozal was a leader with vision and had a strong hold in the Parliament and therefore business could be done with him. Mr. Papandreou listened and then said: “ I used to watch you on the TV when you were the spokesman of your government. I know you mean well Mr. Ambassador. But you must understand me well too. Greek people carry no grudges against Turkey. Many years ago when Prime Minister Inonu visited Mr. Venizelos in Athens and signed with him many agreements my father was a Member of the Cabinet. I lived through those days when there was mutual trust between the two countries. Somehow, tensions invaded the atmosphere later. I think the administrations should be blamed for this. Because friendship between Turkey and Greece is beneficial to both of these peoples. We should use our resources more to the point. For example now that you are buying 160 aircraft we feel bound to do the same and make additional investments. I agree with you that the starting point of any good relationship is dialogue. But as things stand now how can you or anyone expect me to shake hands with the Turkish side when for example the island of Cyprus is under occupation. How can I look at the face of the Greek people if I do that? Please convey this to Mr. Ozal with my sincere greetings.” I said I would and reiterated our views on those points and underlined that problems could not be solved unless there was dialogue. When I took leave, Mr. Papandreou said, “We have to talk more Mr. Akiman, I shall call you next month”. But he never called.

Three years passed until I saw Mr. Papandreou the second time and that was the morning following the awesome crisis of 27/28 March 1987. But during those three difficult years I saw Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Kapsis instead perhaps a thousand! Times. Mr. Kapsis had a long record of prolific anti-Turkish (as well as anti-American) writings to his credit. I saw him often because there were serious and unsolved issues: problems emanating from our disagreements regarding the width of Aegean territorial waters, delineation of the continental shelf, the FIR, the air space, militarization of the de-militarized islands and also problems such as the Turkish minority in the North etc. And, of course, Cyprus! Strictly speaking Cyprus was not a bilateral issue, but it cast a dark shadow on our relations. All these problems had to be solved and the only way to solution naturally had to pass through bilateral negotiation. In the absence of such an instrument however all we did was to protest against each other, most of the time publicly. Almost every two or three days – and I are not exaggerating – I was called by Deputy Minister Kapsis to be given a written or an oral protest. 

The characteristics of those three years up to March 1987 can be summarized as follows: 
Mr. Papandreou and his Government continued with the same policy of non-dialogue and attacks on Turkey causing us great frustration as we labored in our quest to begin a serious dialogue with Athens. It was bad enough that we endured a barrage of criticisms and condemnation in Greece conducted mainly for internal political purposes. The Papandreou government also used every opportunity in the international arena to condemn “Turkey’s threat and aggression”. And where it could, Greece used its veto, for example, preventing the release of EU funds earmarked for Turkey. And as Turkey gained importance mainly because of international happenings in the region, Greece leaned even more on isolating its neighbor. Hence the policies against Turkey’s candidacy in the EU. In addition, we in Turkey believed that Greece wanted to see Turkey weaken internally and we took strong exception to the shelter given by Athens to PKK and Armenian terrorists. 

Yet during those turbulent years, before the crisis of March 1987 that ultimately paved the way to Davos, we could show something concrete for our labors. During my tenure, the Turkish Embassy became one of the most frequented places in Athens. Many in the private sector, professors, and members of the literary and artistic communities attended most of our social gatherings. Even in that atmosphere we managed to arrange visits between the Chairmen of Chambers of Commerce of Athens and Istanbul. We initiated the setting up of a “Greek-Turkish Business Council”. Turkish musicians gave recitals, conducted the Athens Philharmonic. The unilateral suspension of visa requirement opened the doors to many Greeks, especially to those living in the North, to go on daily shopping trips from the markets and groceries in Turkey even on a “buy now - pay later” basis. Prime Minister Ozal at the risk of being criticized by members of his own Cabinet and the Turkish press went even further to suggest signing of an agreement of good neighborliness and non-violation of boundaries with Greece, a sort of a non-aggression pact. Unfortunately, the Greek government spurned all this. Looking back, it is no wonder that we found ourselves at the brink of an unwanted war in late March 1987. That crisis would not have been possible if Greece had accepted Turkey’s initiatives to begin a dialogue.

At the end of February 1987 a consortium of companies called the Northern Aegean Petroleum Company announced that it would start drilling for oil on the continental shelf 10 miles off the island of Thasos. It was also announced that a law was being formulated which would make the Government the sole authority to decide where the drillings would take place. Immediately after these announcements were made I was instructed to see Mr. Kapsis and tell him once more - because we had already protested more than once when same kind of activities took place earlier - that the Turkish Government still expected Greece to abide by the rules of the Bern Agreement and in case of a breach the responsibility would fall on Greece. Mr. Kapsis retorted that the Greek Government considered the Bern Agreement ‘inoperative’, therefore it would decide to drill when and wherever it likes in the Aegean. In order to be absolutely sure I rephrased my comment in the form of a question. Mr. Kapsis repeated himself. There was no choice left for me but to remind Mr. Kapsis of the Greek responsibility in this and warn him against grave consequences.

As soon as I finished my report to Ankara, Mr. Boutos (then an independent Member of the Parliament) who had asked for an appointment several days ago came to visit me. Mr. Boutos was said to be close to Mr. Papandreou. While we were talking, the subject of the Consortium came up and he said that the Government’s intention behind the proposed law aiming to take over some of the prerogatives from the Consortium was to curtail any possible misunderstanding between Greece and Turkey on the search for oil in the Aegean. At that point I gave a short account to Mr. Boutos of what passed between Mr. Kapsis and myself a few hours ago. I also emphasized that if Greek drilling would start on the Aegean continental shelf once again, Turkey would react to that very strongly. Upon hearing from me that Greece and Turkey were on a collision course, Mr. Boutos seemed to be shocked, “There must be something wrong in this, and I shall be back!” He said and left.

Late in the afternoon the radios were constantly announcing that the Cabinet had a very urgent meeting, the Greek drilling ship escorted by a cruiser was on its way towards Thasos, a Turkish drilling vessel together with a cruiser was also said to leave for the North Aegean Sea, there was an extremely serious crisis, perhaps even a war was imminent, military mobilization was ordered, people had already made stocks of food…etc. And all of a sudden Mr. Boutos rang and said that he was calling from Mr. Papandreou’s office and he wished to come immediately to see me. He seemed highly excited when he came. He said and I quote: “I told Mr. Papandreou what Mr. Kapsis told you this morning word by word. The Prime Minister was furious, he said that this was the first time that he heard Kapsis told Mr. Akiman such things; he said that the Greek Government never had such intentions. As I left his office the Prime Minister was calling Mr. Kapsis to instruct him to see you and to rectify the situation.” When Mr. Boutos requested that our conversation should be kept secret I asked him why Mr. Papandreou chose not to convey this message through official channels. Mr. Boutos replied: “He has no one to trust; as you have witnessed even Mr. Kapsis had not told him properly what passed between you and him this morning.”

The telephone rang. It was Mr. Kapsis who asked me over. Our meeting lasted almost an hour and after beating around the bush Mr. Kapsis said and I quote: “Let me clarify what I told you this morning: The Greek government has the right as to whether it will permit, how it will permit and when it will permit research and drilling beyond the Greek territorial waters on the Greek continental shelf. So if the Turkish Government officially announces that the Turkish drilling ship which we know is about to leave port will only make scientific explorations outside the Turkish territorial waters, I will then make a reciprocal announcement reciting our rights but in addition I will say that the Greek Government has no plans for drilling outside the Greek territorial waters.”

From what Mr. Kapsis had just told me, and the message I got from Mr. Papandreou, it was obvious that the Greek side was now looking for a suitable way to get out of this precarious situation. And we were certainly prepared to defuse this crisis. But as soon as I came back to the office I heard a member of the Turkish General Staff making an announcement on the Ankara radio saying that a partial mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces had also been ordered in case the crisis led to a military clash. I immediately called the Foreign Minister but he was not in Turkey, so I related my last talks with Mr. Boutos and Mr. Kapsis together with my impressions to the Foreign Under-Secretary and explicitly underlined that the latest utterrings of both Mr. Boutos and Mr. Kapsis led me to believe that Mr. Papandreou already felt that he had reached the brink from where he should now make a volte-face! However, I was merely told that the chips were already down and nothing could be done and that, in any case, it was the Greek side who should be blamed for all this. This blunt statement and the rather swift reaction of the Turkish naval authorities at a time when both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were absent made me suspect that some hardliners in Ankara might have other plans, possible results of which we could do without - unless what I heard on the phone was said on purpose! At that moment the only person I could turn to was Prime Minister Ozal who could make the right approach so as to make the most of this propitious moment. At that moment Prime Minister Ozal was in London where he had made a stopover on his way back from the States and I conveyed to him the situation in detail.

Late that night Mr. Ozal made a statement in London saying that it was Greece and not Turkey who was violating the Bern Agreement by drilling on the continental shelf. So, if Greece had no such plans Turkey would call back its ships because Turkey never had the intention to drill on the continental shelf anyway. Mr. Ozal added that Turkey always wanted to establish friendly relations with Greece and that this last incident showed the imperative of starting a dialogue. (Many years later it was made public that before Mr. Ozal made that statement in London he checked it with President Evren.)

The next morning Mr. Kapsis made his announcement as promised but could not help add that it was the Turkish side that blinked first! He also called me to his office and said that the Greek Government wished to de-escalate the tension in the Aegean and therefore bilateral negotiations should begin only to explore the possibilities of signing a ‘compromis’ for submitting the case to the World Court; and during the period of negotiations a de facto moratorium would prevail. I immediately understood where Mr. Kapsis was driving at and therefore made no comment except to say that I would report to Ankara what he said word by word. The crisis had been defused.

My government thought that this was an opportune moment to start a new diplomatic initiative. Upon detailed instructions from Ankara I asked for an appointment from Mr. Papandreou the next morning. When we met in the garden of his bungalow-office in Kastri, he said: “Latest developments gave me real concern. Had they led us to war it would have been a catastrophe for Greece. Ambassador Akiman, we did not build this economy easily. I am sure you will appreciate that the destruction of this edifice would be catastrophic. Of course, no one would be the victor in such a war. Therefore, the de-escalation of the tension was most proper. However, this successful ending should not be presented to the public as a heroic deed. Yesterday in fact there were rumors that Turkey had retreated. I was mad at that and immediately gave instructions to my associates that no such thing should happen again.”

Mr. Papandreou then explained that the Government wanted to control the Consortium and this was why it had tabled the law in question and that although the Government did not heed the Bern Agreement it had no intention to go against its provisions. He said that he had not heard of any such decision of the Consortium to drill beyond territorial waters until I mentioned it to Mr. Boutos. “Look Mr. Akiman” he said, “you have been a government official for years and you know how it is. Some of the associates around me are over-patriotic. I cannot control them as I wished to. I know you have been misinformed and treated in a ‘go today – come back tomorrow!’ Sort of way. But I have now decided that you will treat Turco-Greek relations only with me. And I will tell Mr. Kapsis ‘I am sorry.’ We should start the dialogue as soon as possible. I sincerely believe that a friendship can be established between Mr. Ozal and myself, as was the case between Ataturk and Venizelos. I have two years before me and I intend to reach this goal.”

 During the following nine months I visited Mr. Papandreou more than a dozen times. Most of the time we worked on a text, which would explain to the public why the two countries decided to start the dialogue, what would be the subject matter of this dialogue and the mechanism for it. Mr. Papandreou was keen on not rushing things and was very meticulous on wording. He also did not want to give too much publicity to our meetings; therefore the frequency was adjusted accordingly. Also for the sake of secrecy Mr. Papandreou suggested that instead of reporting through the Embassy telex or the telephone I should personally shuttle between Ankara and Athens to carry the messages.

In the view of the Greek side the subject matter of the potential bilateral negotiations should not be wide. It would be best to narrow it to one single issue: the issue of the continental shelf. And in taking up this matter mention should be made that the sides agreed in advance that this issue eventually might be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

Whereas, Turkey looked at the matter from a different angle. We tried to persuade the Greek side that there existed not one but several issues in the Aegean and links existed between these issues. Secondly, the issues could not be singled out or labeled as judicial or economic or military. Actually, the issues that in time had been politicized by both sides and turned into “national issues” had usually more than one facet to them. Thirdly, setting preconditions in advance like the obligation to go to the World Court for example, would reduce the incentive for the Greek side to enter into substantive negotiations. 

I had long and frank discussions with Mr. Papandreou. I felt that the Prime Minister was in general considerate towards the Turkish position. For example, he showed understanding when we wanted to keep the Cyprus matter outside the bilateral negotiations. He was also agreeable when we insisted that no precondition should be set for any issue during the talks. He only wished to include the ICJ factor and even on that he did not insist. Apparently the severe crisis had been somewhat conducive to a sober reassessment of existing policies and Mr. Papandreou was courageous enough to reverse his policies if need be. He had done so several times especially in internal politics. 

In a few months time the two Prime Ministers decided to meet in Davos at the end of January 1988. They agreed to establish two key committees: The ‘Joint Committee on Co-operation’ would explore the areas of co-operation such as economic cooperation, joint venture, trade, tourism, communications, cultural exchanges. And the ‘Greek-Turkish Political Committee’ would define the problem areas, explore the possibilities of closing the gap and move towards lasting solutions. Both committees met twice in Greece and Turkey alternatively during the months of May and September 1988. The Ministers concerned presided over them. During those meetings a lot of ground was covered. And as an additional important feature ‘A Memorandum of Understanding’ was signed by the two Foreign Ministers on confidence building measures between the two countries. The two Committees would have their third round of meetings during the first half of 1989 and Mr. Papandreou would return his counterpart’s visit during that same year. 

I think that since the Venizelos-Ataturk era it was the first time that the two countries seriously laid down their mutual problems before them in full recognition that it was to their benefit to work together and cooperate. The Davos meeting had the potential to lay down another cornerstone, which could lead to a second period of détente. And again this was the doing of two leaders, Papandreou and Ozal. It is, therefore, regrettable that in 1989 a lack of interest started budding. 1989 was general election year for Greece. In addition to the normal attrition, which the party in power had been subjected throughout the years, Mr. Papandreou had already started losing ground on account of his health as well as family troubles. The hard-liners in the Cabinet would rather hold on to the trump cards such as ‘relations with Turkey’ especially during election times. Their constant pressure on Mr. Papandreou eventually made the latter to silently shy away from this affair. And in Turkey the opponents of Ozal used this Greek reluctance to criticize the Government. As a result the committee meetings waned down and a great opportunity for both sides was lost. 

I was assigned to another post several months before the elections took place. And at the elections Mr. Papandreou’s PASOK lost. When New Democracy Party came to power it was hoped that the New Greek government would rejuvenate the work of the committees and things would start moving again. After all the newly elected Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis, was a long-time defender of dialogue and friendship with Turkey. However, New Democracy (with its thin parliamentary majority) was hesitant probably because they were afraid that if they engaged in full-fledged negotiations with Turkey the leading opposition -Pasok - would criticize them for selling-out Greek national interests. In Turkey things were not too different either. Rather weak incumbents and political leaders chose to favor anti-Greek stances for internal and sometimes personal political purposes. 

 That Greek-Turkish relations became increasingly unstable was demonstrated during the Kardak/Imia crisis in 1996. Abortive attempts to improve relations, such as the agreement of principles in the Madrid communiqué of 1997 failed to yield results. Indeed, with the Ocalan affair of 1999, Greek-Turkish relations reached a dangerously low ebb. It took the catastrophe of the earthquakes to put Greek-Turkish relations on a more promising course. 

Now with the Turkish candidacy for EU membership confirmed, and with Greece’s welcome support of Turkey’s EU course, prospects for lasting improvement in Greek-Turkish relations have steadily gained pace. Not that resolving the Aegean and Cyprus issues will be easy. As keen as Turkey is in becoming a member of the EU, it is unhappy that the timetable for and progress in Turkey’s membership might be dependent on the advance achieved on resolving the Aegean issues. For Greece and Turkey have not moved closer on their approaches to resolving the Aegean issues. The Turkish side would like the Aegean issues treated as a whole and for substantive negotiations to take place before any recourse to the ICJ. Of course, Greece is free to take up the continental-shelf issue as the only problem in the Aegean, and so is Turkey free to think otherwise. But as long as they do not agree on a comprehensive resolution of all existing problems, the ones that have been left out will somehow emerge to haunt the atmosphere. And all this will inevitably have an adverse effect on Turkish-Greek relations. 

This is not to say that various options cannot be envisaged to break the Aegean impasse. There could be trade-off, for example, whereby Greece accepts to limit its Aegean territorial seas to the present 6 miles in return for Turkey accepting to refer the continental shelf case to the ICJ in accordance with a negotiated compromise.

As for the other tough question, that of Cyprus, there are clearly dangers that no settlement there will damage Greek-Turkish relations again. There is concern in Turkey that if Cyprus became an EU member before the problem in the island is resolved, this would jeopardize Turkish Cypriot rights and mean a failure of Turkey’s decades-old support of the Turkish community there. In my view, Turkey must adopt new policies to avert any predicament, which would result from the accession of Greek Cyprus to the EU in a few years time. As far as a solution to Cyprus, with each side on the island rejecting the other’s proposals, one option may be for the EU itself to help create a united state of Cyprus consisting of two independent entities, which will act as two equal parts of the whole. If the EU can muster the leverage to move in that direction and persuade the two communities to sign simultaneous agreements with the EU, then we could see progress all around. This will be to the benefit of both Cypriot communities as well as Greece and Turkey. 

The Kokkalis Program has received and publishes on its website the letter of Yannis Kapsis, former Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of the Greek Parliament:

The narration of former ambassador of Turkey to Greece Mr. Akiman could be a major contribution to the diplomatic history of his country. He tried to prove that for all the evils and failures of Turkey's foreign policy only one man was responsible: the notorious Mr. Kapsis. I have to admit that for a second I felt flattered to be considered such an iron-fist politician who managed to drag the two countries to the brink of war, in spite of the will of their respective leaderships. But Mr. Akiman's allegations were so naïve and full of obvious inaccuracies and distortions that I felt insulted not as a politician only but as a human being as well.

Yet the speech of the former ambassador, who years after never lost the opportunity to convey to me his 'warm feelings' and 'appreciation' for our cooperation, has its own value. It brings in mind a question: why do a former Turkish diplomat and a distinguished Greek Institution decide to combine efforts with only one purpose: to discredit a former minister who today is nothing more than a back-bencher M.P. of the ruling party. Retarded bitterness; or a warning that his opposition to the new balance of power at the Aegean will be no more tolerated;

An answer to such a question could be a prejusment of the forthcoming developments in the region. And could be approached only by a more objective evaluation of 1987's crisis- a turning point in the Greco-Turkish relations.

1. The ultimate lie.
   
   Mr. Akiman alleged that the starting point of the crisis was a Greek government's announcement that a Greek drilling ship, escorted by a cruiser sailed for drilling operations in the Aegean.

   The truth:
   1.  Greek administration never owned a drilling boat. Greek navy never had a cruiser. And never was such an announcement.

2.  The crisis began with the Turkish Defense Council (which stands above the government) decision, announced in the most solemn way, that "..The Turkish boat Sismic escorted by a Turkish navy flotilla, will sail on March 18 to Aegean for seismic researches"

The announcement was transmitted by the official Turkish News Agency and all the international news media (documents available).

3.  The Greek defense council presided over by A. Papandreou, met immediately and decided that in such a case the rules of engagement will be enforced. And the Greek fleet sailed into the Aegean.

2. The preparation of a crisis.

   1. Denison Mining Company, a Canadian-American consortium drilling at the coast of Northern Greece, had been always very eager to get new concessions, as the old ones were quickly exhausted. But I had always refused to approve any demand beyond our territorial waters.

   I had given to Mr. Akiman many copies of my communications to this end, with the ministry of Industry- responsible for drilling operations- and he had expressed his appreciation.

   2. On March 18 Mr. Parmeli, the manager of Denison in Greece announced that his Company will ignore the restrictions of the Greek government. As a result, and to prevent that, Greek government decided to buy-off all the shares of Denison.

   3. Eager to reduce the coming tension I took two initiatives: a/ I rejected Parmeli's statement and stressed that when the Greek government will buy-off Denison's shares it will be up to us to decide 'if…when…and where' will shell drill. And b/ I changed the previous statements that we did not recognize the Bern's agreement saying that the agreement is valid and only the article 5 is 'inoperative' because it provides that the two countries must abstain from drillings in the Aegean as far as consultations are going on. And it was the Turkish government the one who stepped out.

   4. At the same time I delivered a written notice to Mr. Akiman a/ urging Turkish government to state that negotiations for the submission of the case at the International Court will be resumed b/ reassuring them that Denison will be not allowed to proceed with its plans. And c/ stressing that "Greek government without to alienate its rights will follow a policy of self restriction to keep peace in the region."

   Mr. Akiman in a highly disfamatory way distorted the meaning of all these efforts trying to present them as hostile acts.
   

3. The great crisis is on.

   1. Papandreou in order to stress that we had no intention to yield under pressure ordered the Greek navy to keep a security silence. The meaning of this was that we could not change orders under any circumstances.

   It is difficult to describe the diplomatic activity of those days. I spent three days and nights in my office together with all the diplomats involved in a desperate effort to inform the international community but most of all our allies in NATO that a real war was imminent. And we were not to be blamed.

   As a result of our efforts one by one all European governments took our side and made clear to Ankara that they will bear full responsibility for the developments. More active was the NATO's Secretary General Lord Carrington who was in contact with me (documents available).

   At the midst of the crisis Mr. Akiman paid an unexpected visit and exercised a strong pressure to get a formal assurance that we shell not drill. It was very strange initiative because it was more than obvious that we had no such intention. On the other hand I could not ignore Papandreou's instructions that no binding statement would be made because it would be considered as alienation of our rights. Yet I dared to go a step forward. I dragged Akiman out of my office and said: "Let's talk unofficially on a friendly base. Why are you asking this? You know very well that even if we had such an intention we cannot. The drilling boat is at Perama shipyards for repairs which will take at least a year."

   Less than an hour later Mr. Akiman made an open phone call to his superior in Ankara and, sure that we can listen, he blamed them in a very terse way, unbecoming for his rank, stressing that "you have created a mess. You must take the nuts out of the fire." Only then I realized that was washing his hands like Pontius Pilatus.

   2. Late on the night of March 28 the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal arrived in London on his way back from the States where he had a heart operation. Only there he felt the pressure of the European governments and proceeded to a very dreadful initiative: he ordered his fleet to change course and sail back stating that the decision of the Defense Council had been misunderstood. The powerful Council opposed. And there was a serious internal crisis. Mr. Ozal survived only when President, general Evren took his side.

   The crisis was over.
   

4. Three unanswered questions.

   1. On January 1996 the 'evil Mr. Kapsis' was not a member of the government. Yet the most serious crisis erupted and for 48 hours more than 40 ships, of both countries, were gathered in a narrow strait off the Immia Islet, ready to open fire. Mr. Akiman did not say a word about it. Why? The only difference was that on 1987 it was Turkey who lost face and was condemned by the international community. On 1996 it was Greece who lost three naval officers killed in action and its sovereign rights over the Islet.

   2. He presented himself as the savor of the peace. A few months after the crisis, in Konstantinople, Mr. Mesout Yilmaz the then foreign minister told me: "I have good news for both of us. We kicked Akiman to Madrid." And as a result of it he was forced to resign. Andreas Papandreou promoted me to the rank of minister.

   3. Yet the most crucial question remains: Fifteen years have passed since that crisis. Why now a former diplomat and a prominent Institution combined efforts to discredit somebody who is only a back-bencher M.P. of the ruling party? To rewrite history? It could be so although it has been done in the most unacademic way- without the 'altera pars'. Or, having in mind that he is one of those who can prevent an unfortunate development for Greek interests, he has to be discredited in an effort to shape history in the making?
   

5. Is there any hope for Peace?

   1.  There are not unsolved problems. There are only unwilling politicians.

   On September 27, 1983, that is to say a year after I joined the government the then ambassador Allatsam delivered to me a written notice stating that his government accepts my proposal that "The two governments will declare that they have not any territorial claim on each other and they shell respect the existing status quo."

   It could be a breakthrough. But I had done a mistake. I had proposed also, that as a token of good will the two countries would reduce by 50% the number of the fighter planes they were then about to buy at that period. The agreement was opposed by the military establishment and others concerned.

   On September 16, 1986 the Greek Defense and Foreign Policy Council endorsed unanimously a proposal of mine suggesting to raise all our objections for the association of Turkey with E.E. under the condition that our partners will impose the rules and principles of the Community to the new partner, the respect of international agreements included.

   It was easy for Ankara to foresee such an evolution. And provoked the crisis of 1987 in an effort to bring Greece around the table for a package deal- that is to say to redraw the boundaries among the two countries, before that. It failed. The new process is based on 'Helsinki resume'. It remains to be seen if Ankara will try to interpret them on its own way. In such a case a new crisis will erupt.

   For the sake of an everlasting peace in the region there are many in Greece willing to make some new concessions. But they cannot answer the question: what guaranties they can get that after a few years Turkey will not raise new demands. And it is a crucial question.

   Since the end of the war Greek leaders have tried many times to reach some kind of an agreement with Turkey. Every time Ankara managed to get some concessions and after a while they asked for more. This 'salami tactic' has been very successful in the Cyprus problem. And Greeks have learned, at last, their lesson.