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Privacy

Privacy is a critical element of trust (e.g., Boston Consulting Group, 1997). The extension of information is a canonical definition of trust in sociological experiments to determine trust in computer-mediated environment (e.g., Abric & Kahanes, 1972; Weisband & Kiesler, 1996).

Identity and autonomy are critical elements of privacy.

Authentication is uniquely problematic for governmental bodies, as well. An understanding of the dimensions of privacy and the stake-holders in the privacy debates will illuminate privacy in all its complexity. Unlike in business relationships, citizens must trust government to some degree. Government can require information. Unlike commerce, there is no option of turning to a competitor or simply doing without 'consumption' of government.

Even more so than trust, privacy is an overloaded word. In order to examine privacy in terms of e-government and citizenship, it is necessary to understand privacy as three oft-confused rights - a right of autonomy, a right to seclusion and a property right. (Camp, 2000)

Privacy to some means Constitutional privacy rights and the United Nations' (United Nations, 1995) identification of privacy as a fundamental human right. (e.g., Bloustein, 1968; Cohen, 1996) Citizens who consider privacy a fundamental right may browse the web but are not likely to transact with digital government until privacy-enhanced mechanisms of payment are available. Citizens who see privacy as an absolute may demand that government provide citizen-controlled software or high levels of anonymity in searches and transactions. Yet governance in general and transactions specifically require the provision of information: items selected, time of order, mechanism of payment, delivery address. Without transactional capacity e-government will not reach its potential.

Privacy to others means the right to be left alone. (Prosser, 1941) The second group, those who would be left alone, is not entirely separate from the first. One can want to be left alone and want no exposure of certain personal information. For example, a citizen may be very willing to expose personal preferences about the material he or she reads at the Department of Agriculture about weather conditions and invasive plants; but want control over searches for information on medical conditions. For those wishing to be left alone the ideal relationship is represented by a single search or transaction, which is neither tracked nor used as the basis for any further contact from government.

Privacy to a third group means choice over personal data and the tradeoffs in its protection or exposure. (E.g., Mell, 1996). This group feels that their data are valuable. For these citizens all transactions should reflect a balance between risk and reward. A large number of such people will give data happily for speedier service, or avoiding a visit to the physical government office. These are the customers who may be willing to pay fee-for-service, thereby funding innovations in e-government.

Privacy is critical because government interaction with citizens always has autonomy issues, as only government is in the business of law enforcement. Systems which design with the assumption that privacy is an issue of property or seclusion should not be adopted for use in government.

How do these models of privacy and the resulting implications for technology map to specific designs for individual agencies rolling out web services with today's available technology? What are the implications for these choices in terms of society, technology and even future technological choices. These subtle and interrelated questions are the subject of the proposed workshop.